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I. Introduction
Like death and taxes, bank failures and systemic financial sector distress appear to
be facts of life in the industrial world, as well as developing and transitional economies.
Since the late 1970s, 112 episodes of systemic banking crisis have occurred in 93 coun-
tries, with an additional 51 borderline crises recorded in 46 countries (Caprio, Klingebiel
1999).
These periodic episodes of financial distress are costly to governments and taxpayers
alike. On average, these costs have amounted to 12.8 percent of the national GDP with
the percentage still higher (14.3 percent) in developing countries. But in many countries,
the costs are much higher. Argentina and Chile spent as much as 40-55 percent of
their GDP to resolve their crises in the early 1980s, and the recent East Asian crisis is
expected to cost in the vicinity of 20-55 percent of their GDP (Honohan, Klingebiel,
2000).
But these numbers do not tell the entire story. They do not include the indirect
costs, or human costs, incurred. Examples include the loss of, or delays in accessing,
deposits; lack of credit; higher interest rates charged to cover the losses on nonper-
forming loans; lost wages as a result of layoffs in both the financial and corporate
sectors; and the opportunity costs associated with forgone investments. The burden
falls disproportionately on the poor as taxes are increased, incomes reduced, job
opportunities lost, and badly needed infrastructure and social programs are reduced or
eliminated.
The effects (and costs) may not be limited solely to the country experiencing the
crisis. In a global economy, financial instability can be easily transmitted to neighboring
countries or more distant trading partners.
The importance of limiting the costs of the crisis through quick resolution has
long been recognized. But in practice this has proven difficult. It is now some four
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and half-years since the onset of the Asian crisis, and economic recovery in each of the
three crisis countries continues to be hampered by the lingering effects of the crisis.
While, in general, weak and insolvent banks have been closed or otherwise resolved,
financial systems remain weak in many countries, intermediation is low, and corporate
debt restructuring and asset disposition remains slow. Authorities continue to look for
ways to speed up the process.
Key factors in delaying the resolution process, and thus increasing the cost of the
crisis, have been the lack of an enabling framework to support asset resolution, and an
understanding of the proper application of the tools available. While each country faces
a unique set of circumstances, including differing legal and institutional frameworks,
the number of alternative approaches is limited, and the application of certain basic
resolution features is universal. This paper attempts to provide broad guidance on the
specific issue of asset resolution, through the development of principles to guide the
resolution process. Section II defines asset resolution, and provides an overview of its
importance within the context of resolving either a single weak institution, or multiple
institutions during a financial crisis. Section III looks at the prerequisites for developing
the supporting framework necessary to support asset resolution. Section IV identifies
the essential elements of an enabling resolution framework. Section V discusses issues
surrounding the implementation of the asset resolution process. Section VI concludes by
suggesting a set of principles to guide an effective asset resolution process.
II. What is "Asset Resolution" and Why Is It Important?
To the general public, when a bank is closed or recapitalized, the problem is solved.
But to the authorities, the problem has just begun. Suddenly they are faced with having
to liquidate, or wind up the estate of the failed bank in an orderly manner. This requires
them to "resolve" or reduce to cash, in a timely fashion, the assets of the failed institution
in order to recoup the costs incurred in honoring the government's deposit guarantee,
and to provide payments to other creditors if any surplus remains.
What do these assets consist of? Broadly speaking, they can be defined as: the deposit
and product franchises; liquid instruments, consisting of cash and readily marketable
securities and bonds; loans-both performing and nonperforming; and other assets such
as real estate, equipment, and other miscellaneous assets on which the bank may have
foreclosed. Partnership interests in various projects, may also be included in this category.
For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the intervening authority has moved
expeditiously to transfer the deposit franchise, and as many other assets as possible, to
another institution (purchase and assumption). There will, however, be a core group of
distressed assets that remain. These are assets, which due to the level of their impairment,
the purchasing institution is unwilling to assume, even with the protection of appropriate
guaranties or warranties.
In the case of an individual bank failure, the number of the assets involved may be
small and markets are functioning. Thus, the resolution process may be handled without
creating undue distortions in the market. But in the case of systemic crisis, the num-
ber of impaired assets surpasses the capacity of the existing resolution system. The level
of dislocation within the market, makes it difficult to value assets appropriately, and
asset sales may further depress market conditions. Economic stability must be restored
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before investors are willing to enter the market. The legal framework for creditor rights
and insolvency (including corporate reorganization) and out-of-court workouts, must be
developed and implemented. Many corporations and their loans must be restructured
before they can be sold. Furthermore, at each stage of the process, powerful, politi-
cally well-connected vested interests are likely to intervene, in an attempt to stop the
implementation of an effective resolution process. All of these difficulties combine to
impede and block the resolution process.
However, large stocks of non-performing loans exact a heavy price. First, they
weaken the repayment ethic. As borrowers see their banks closed, or others default with-
out penalty, they follow (strategic defaulters). Experience has shown that "if left unre-
solved, nonperforming assets can deepen the severity and duration of financial crises,
and complicate macroeconomic management." A large stock of non-performing assets
locks up scarce financial capital in non-productive projects and impedes the resumption
of efficient intermediation that is vital for economic recovery.
It is this critical linkage between the banks and the corporate sector, which has
been too often overlooked in the discussion of asset disposition. One school of thought
has held that the banks transmit their problems to the corporate sector. As institutions
weaken and fail, the flow of credit is reduced, creating a "credit crunch." Borrowers
suddenly find themselves cut-off from financing, and are unable to purchase new raw
materials or invest in new projects, thus contributing to the slowdown in economic
activity.
2
This view, tends to regard the corporations as innocent victims decimated by the
sudden onset of a currency crisis. Thus, much of the initial response to the crisis will
focus on ensuring the availability of trade flows, providing mechanisms to ensure the
availability of foreign currency, relieving the "credit crunch," and the design of forbear-
ance programs, to provide corporations with breathing room in which to recover.
While individual bank failures can usually be traced to fraud, poor management,
and poor choice of borrowers, systemic crises don't just happen. They may be triggered
by an external shock (for example currency devaluations, sharp increases in interest
rates, drop in demand), but research reveals that the causes of systemic crisis are deeply
rooted in macroeconomic factors, such as policy mistakes, particularly as it relates to
deregulation within the financial sector, poor regulation and supervision, inadequate risk
management, and poor governance both in the financial and corporate sectors, to name
a few (Sheng, 1996). In East Asia, it is apparent that the traditional government-business
ties, the predominance of state banks, the common ownership of conglomerates (bor-
rowers) and their banks, inadequate corporate governance, and the lack of transparency
in accounting and other information flows, all combined to create the crisis which has
devastated the region.
In a systemic crisis, it is apparent that the contagion works the other way. The
corporate sector is already weak. Weak and ineffective supervision and regulation, has
allowed banks to engage in a prolonged period of financing low-margin or loss making
1. David Woo, Two Approaches to Resolving Nonperforming Assets During Financial Crisis, IMF
WORKING PAPER, Mar. 2000, 3.
2. See The FDIC and RTC Experience, Managing the Crisis, for discussion of the effect of bank
failures in rural communities.
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enterprises. Corporate profitability and returns on investment are typically low, leverage
is high, and interest coverage is deteriorating. As the strength of the banks' loan portfolios
is a derivative of corporate earnings, all banks will have weak portfolios, and there are
few "good" borrowers. Proper intermediation and the return to sustainable economic
growth can not begin, until these weak performers are weeded out, the corporate sector
returns to health, and the banks begin to intermediate to economically viable projects.
This failure to recognize the linkage between the corporate sector and the banks,
and to develop appropriate policies to deal with both in the context of systemic crisis,
lies at the heart of many asset resolution problems. Simply put, the financial system
cannot function properly without a strong, vibrant corporate sector. Merely resolving
weak and insolvent banks is not sufficient. An enabling framework to support the asset
resolution process must also be created and implemented. Without an ability to cleanse
the stock of bad loans through liquidation or restructuring, the stock of bad loans will
remain, the flow of new nonperforming assets is likely to continue, economic growth,
and ultimately macroeconomic and fiscal stability will remain at risk.
III. Prerequisites for the Development of an Enabling
Framework for Asset Resolution, the Role of Government
Government must take the lead in developing a climate for effective asset resolution.
As only the government has adequate financial resources to recapitalize the banking sec-
tor, it should have the determining say in the design of a resolution process to minimize
the fiscal burden. But, just as governments do not make good owners of banks, they also
do not make good asset restructuring decisions. These should be left to the private sector
as borrowers and creditors. The government's role, therefore, should be restricted to pro-
viding the coordination and leadership necessary to create a sound enabling framework,
that supports the intermediation of scarce resources to economically viable projects, pro-
vides a liquidation and rehabilitation mechanism for distressed borrowers, and promotes
the safety and soundness of the financial sector through strong supervision and regula-
tion. In addition, the framework must be efficient, inexpensive, transparent, predictable,
and accountable.
A. SPEED Is OF THE ESSENCE
Financial sector problems do not disappear with the passage of time. Ignored, they
continue to grow and losses mount. Given the amount of lead-time necessary to build
an effective framework, governments should begin to put the framework in place well
before the onset of any crisis, to ensure that the principles and tools of asset resolution
are fully functioning when needed. If this work has not begun, governments must be
prepared to engage in serious reform efforts as soon as the first signs of crisis appear. This
willingness, known as political will, is likely to be the single most important determinant
of the speed and success of the resolution process.
B. COMPREHENSIVE, CONSISTENT APPROACH
Asset resolution involves the redistribution of wealth and control. Therefore, the
design of an effective asset resolution framework will determine how the costs will be
376 Law and Business Review of the Americas
shared between the government (taxpayers), owner/investors (both domestic and for-
eign), and lenders. While the framework generally rests on a comprehensive set of prin-
ciples, including a strong rule of law which favors contract enforcement, broad based
corporate ownership, insolvency procedures favoring rehabilitation, rather than liquida-
tion of distressed corporations, and an informal work out process, the exact design of
each of these elements will be dependent on each country's unique circumstances, and
the political tradeoffs required to build a consensus approach. The difficulties involved
in gaining this consensus, should not be underestimated. When governments are weak,
lack clear mandates, and are subject to pressures from powerful vested interests, the
resolution process can be expected to stall.
As important, if not more important, than a comprehensive approach, is consistent
application of the chosen approach. Borrowers, lenders, and investors want the assur-
ance of predictability. Their willingness to enter into a restructuring, investment, or
purchase transaction is based on assumptions regarding their treatment under the frame-
work. If the rules of the game are constantly changing, or are applied in an inconsistent
manner, asset resolution will be prolonged, and the value of the assets will deteriorate
accordingly.
C. RECOGNIZE THE LosSES
Asset resolution requires the recognition of losses and results in the redistribution of
wealth and control. Assets removed from distressed banks are among the most impaired
in the system, and should be marked to market quickly, to avoid the perception that
they represent a stock of "hidden wealth."
This loss of value is difficult for the public, bankers, and government officials alike
to grasp. Many of the borrowers are prominent members of the elite, highly visible
corporations with many employees, or "trophy assets" such as major hotels/resorts or
office buildings. It seems counterintuitive that these obligations are now worth a small
proportion of their face value.
But nonperforming loans (NPLs), are loans on which the borrowers have stopped
making payments. The reasons for default are varied. Borrowers may simply walk away
from their obligations if there is no legal means to enforce contracts. Or the borrower
may have gone out of business. Some feel that defaulters have an unfair advantage, so
they also default, to level the playing field. Many believe that they are relieved of their
obligation to repay when their bank is closed. Still others feel no obligation to repay as
the "loan" represented a "gift" or "fee." In most cases though, borrowers default because
their income stream or cash flows are not sufficient to meet their obligations. As a result,
they will redirect their cash flows to those payments which are necessary for survival,
for example wages, inventory purchases, and the like. When a borrower's cash flow has
been interrupted on a permanent basis, the loan is deemed to be impaired. That is, its
realizable value (the amount anticipated to be collected from all sources) is less than
its face or stated value. Nonperforming loans, therefore, represent loans that will not be
collected in full.
When assets are sold, the investors are purchasing a stream of payments. Unlike the
example above, they do not merely sum up the aggregate amount of the expected pay-
ments to arrive at the purchase price. Instead, they project the cash flow (net of expenses)
to be generated from the underlying asset, and apply a discount factor reflecting their
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desired return, given the perceived risk of the investment. This figure is substantially
below either the face, or realizable value of the asset, and represents a permanent loss of
value to the seller.
If asset resolution is to proceed in an orderly manner, the government must be
prepared to accept its share of the losses. Adoption of an investor-oriented approach
to asset valuation provides a more realistic indication of the likely sales prices. It also
provides a benchmark against which to evaluate sales proposals, and the effectiveness of
the resolution process, as well as minimizes the criticism of "fire sales."
IV. Essential Elements of an Enabling Framework
for Asset Resolution
A. CREDIT CULTURE
The best defense is a good offense; a strong, vibrant financial sector is built upon a
strong credit culture or body of practices which ensure sound lending. These practices
rest on the recognition, that both the lender and the borrower are using the depositors'
funds. Both the lender and the borrower, therefore, assume a fiduciary responsibility
to ensure that, prior to entering into a transaction, both parties are reasonably certain
that the loan can, and will, be repaid. This requires a due diligence process to establish
the capacity to repay; documentation of the financial, legal and other contractual terms
associated with the loan; post disbursement monitoring of the loan to ensure its con-
tinued performance; and finally, a process to deal with problems and conflicts if, and
when, they arise (Corrigan, The Culture of Credit, 2001).
Most bank failures are caused by bad loans. The internal culture of these banks is
weak. They routinely enter into lending transactions without a proper understanding of
the risks involved. They fail to identify and analyze multiple sources of repayment for
each transaction. They fail to document the loan properly, particularly with respect to
their security interest in collateral. Once the loan is made, they fail to monitor its repay-
ment (including properly recording all payments), and the on-going financial condition
of the borrower. Finally, after a default, they fail to take firm action to ensure repayment.
Supervisors should require every bank, to have and adhere to, a written credit
manual that details the basics of its culture. At a minimum, this policy manual should
contain the bank's mission statement; define the types of loans that a bank will make, as
well as those that they will not make (for example speculative purposes, gambling, and
illegal activities); outline their credit approval process, as well as the post disbursement
monitoring process (including standards for credit files), and the steps that must be
taken when loan repayment is in jeopardy. Many banks also include an outline of the
minimum standards of loan documentation. The purpose of all loans should be clearly
documented, and an analysis performed to establish the likelihood of repayment. While
formal credit analysis relies heavily on the application of quantitative techniques, the
basics can easily be captured in an assessment of the 5 C's of Credit: Character, Capacity,
Collateral, Capital, and Conditions (See Box 1).
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Box 1: The Five C's of Credit
Character: This factor deals with the integrity of the borrower. Does the borrower have a history of
meeting its obligations in a timely manner? How has he reacted to past adversities--does he run away,
or does he work to correct the situation? Does he live within his means? Or, is his lifestyle above his
earning capacity, reflecting a possible improper use of funds? Credit Bureaus or reporting agencies can
be very helpful in establishing a borrower's repayment history.
Capacity: Does the borrower earn enough to ensure loan repayment? Is the borrower's free cash flow
sufficient to repay? Care must be exercised to determine the true cash flow of the borrower, as accounting
treatments can generate reported profits well in excess of the borrower's internal cash generation.
Collateral: All collateral is valuable when given, but worth substantially less when repossessed. Among
the questions to be considered here are: what is the likely disposition value of the collateral (based on
an investor-oriented approach to valuation)? What steps must be taken to repossess or gain control of
the collateral, how long will it take, and what will it cost? Many times when a thorough analysis is done,
it is clear that the collateral offered will not provide the bank with the protection it needs. Additional
collateral, often in the form of a personal guarantee secured with the pledge of additional specific assets,
will then be taken.
A word of caution regarding guarantees. In many countries, personal guarantees are regularly taken
without any thought being given to the value or collectibility of the guarantee. In the cases of owners
and managers of closely held corporations without significant outside assets, the guarantee is worthless
if the company defaults. Guarantees, therefore, must be subject to a rigorous analysis of their actual
value in times of distress. Particular attention should be paid to the total amount of debt that the
individual/corporation has guaranteed. If the guarantees are extensive, there may be little likelihood or
ability to honor them if all are called simultaneously.
Capital: This C refers to the equity base of the corporation or transaction. How much does the
borrower truly have at stake? Obviously, the more the borrower has at risk, the greater his incentive to
repay the loan. The multiplier effects of leverage are well known, as are the downsides.
Conditions: Finally, this refers to a more macro assessment of the economic environment in which the
borrower operates. Are sales and revenues likely to grow? Is the currency likely to be stable? Are raw
materials abundant, and at an affordable price? What other external factors, including regulations and
changes in the operating environment, could have a negative affect on repayment, and how likely are they
to occur?
All extensions of credit should be approved by more than one individual. This is
to ensure that there is an independent assessment of each transaction. Many banks use
committees, and others work on an independent signature system, in which multiple
parties are required to sign based on their delegated loan authorities, and the complexity
of the underlying transaction. While a committee provides an opportunity for joint
discussion, peer pressure may lead to less than optimal decisions. The signature system
was designed to avoid this. It must be clearly recognized that the success of this system
also depends on the integrity of the individual decision makers. In order to ensure
greater integrity within the system, many banks have moved to separate the lending or
relationship management functions, from the underwriting or credit approval functions.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
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Under this approach, the lending officers are responsible for identifying loan oppor-
tunities and for maintaining the relationship. The underwriter, and those approving the
loans seldom come in contact with the customer. Instead, the approval of a loan is based
solely on an analysis of the borrower's financial information and other objective data,
obtained from independent sources.
Two additional functions within a bank are required to support and reinforce a
strong credit culture: loan review and workout departments. Loan review performs an
independent audit function, routinely reviewing loans to ensure that they have been
extended in accordance with the policies and procedures of the bank; that they meet
the quality standards desired on an ongoing basis; and that the documentation has been
properly executed. They also validate the classification and level of provisioning required
for a loan. The results of their audits can provide management and owners with an
important early warning signal of potential problems, so that corrective actions can be
taken before the problems warrant supervisory intervention.
Bankers routinely take risk, and it is inevitable that some loans will fail. When this
happens, the loan should be turned over to specialists within the bank for resolution.
These individuals are well versed in the formal and informal procedures and practices for
loan collection. To be successful, management must have made the decision to terminate
the relationship with the borrower, and to accept the losses, if any, inherent in the
resolution process.
B. SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
The role played by weak and ineffective supervision in the creation of financial crisis
is well documented. However, supervisors and regulators also play an important role in
the resolution process. Tighter standards and enforcement procedures, the introduction
of forward looking loan classification and provisioning, and the mandated establishment
of loan workout departments, all contribute to stopping the flow of new bad loans. Cor-
porate restructuring and asset disposition can be encouraged and facilitated through the
development of proper regulatory treatment. Rules defining the classification and provi-
sioning of restructured loans, the valuation and treatment of collateral, and other assets
received in payment of obligations, and limits on holding periods for equity received in
the course of loan restructuring, are but a few examples of the ways in which supervisors
and regulators can facilitate the resolution process. In effect, they can provide borrowers
and lenders alike, with certainty regarding the definition or guidelines of proper credit
relationships in the post crisis environment, allowing corporate restructuring and asset
resolution to proceed.
C. • LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CREDITOR RIGHTS AND INSOLVENCY
3
Asset resolution is dependent upon an efficient, transparent, reliable and predictable
system to enforce credit claims. If an effective mechanism to enforce contracts and
hold borrowers responsible for their obligations is lacking, borrowers have no incentive
3. Gordon Johnson, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems,
THE WORLD BANK, Mar. 2001.
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to cooperate in the resolution process, and scarce capital resources remain locked in
nonproductive ventures. The very threat of a court ordered or supervised liquidation
may induce borrowers to restructure their obligations directly with their lenders. An
efficient and reliable system of enforcing creditor rights and managing corporate dis-
tress, also promotes financial discipline and reinforces prudent lending, by providing an
orderly mechanism for nonviable entities to exit the market, and for the rehabilitation
of distressed, but viable businesses. Key features of an effective system include:
1. The enforcement of unsecured rights. For the credit system to function, unse-
cured creditors must have the ability to enforce their rights to payment through
a timely and inexpensive process. This process should provide for the trans-
formation of the debt to a judgment, or court order for payment, including
provisions for an expedited process for obtaining a judgment, where both par-
ties acknowledge the debt; the seizure of property prior to completion of the
court process through the posting of a bond or other collateral; and a swift
hearing process to determine the appropriateness of the seizure, and provide
for the return of the goods (or an equivalent monetary value), if necessary.
2. The creation, recognition, and enforcement of security interests. Prudent
credit granting requires that each extension of credit have more than one source
of repayment. In most cases, this will require taking a security interest in some
type of collateral. While in many cases the collateral will consist of land, the legal
system should provide an easy, and cost effective method, of obtaining security
interests in all types of assets, moveable and immovable, tangible and intangible,
possessory (stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments) and nonpossessory,
including accounts and notes receivables, and the proceeds thereof, inventory,
property, plant and equipment (including after acquired property), as well as
intellectual property rights. Collateral interests will require notice and registra-
tion systems to put other lenders on notice regarding the existence of prior liens.
To facilitate asset resolution, collateral interests must be fully transferable, and
enforcement procedures should provide for the prompt realization of a secured
lender's rights in its collateral. Prompt, reliable and predictable enforcement of
security interests encourages consensual debt resolution practices, and promotes
higher recovery value by providing investors with greater certainty.
3. An insolvency regime that provides for the timely, efficient, and impartial
resolution of debts through either the liquidation of nonviable business
of the rehabilitation, or restructuring of viable entities. Insolvency regimes
should aim to maximize the value of a firm's assets so as to provide higher distri-
butions to creditors and reduce the burden of the insolvency. This requires that
the legal framework supports the rehabilitation or restructuring of an insolvent
enterprise as a "going concern;' without reliance on inter-company guarantees
or other support. Essential elements of a rehabilitation regime include the impo-
sition of a standstill on collection efforts of all creditors; the extension of new
credit on a priority basis, subject to proper monitoring of the debtor's cash,
and the development of a restructuring plan based on a thorough assessment of
the viability of the business. In addition, it should provide for the equal treat-
ment of similarly situated creditors, the establishment of clear, but reasonable,
deadlines for most actions that occur within the proceedings, allow the transfer
of ownership to creditors in partial settlement of their obligations, and contain
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a method by which an appropriate majority of creditors can vote to accept a
reorganization plan.
The use of the term reorganization or rehabilitation is somewhat mislead-
ing. Although the process may lead to greater value for the creditors, it does
not require that the firm be preserved or left intact. Indeed, most restructuring
plans contain one or more of the following elements: the liquidation or sale of
some or all of the company's assets to a third party; removal and replacement
of some or all of the corporation's management; and a compromise of the debt
owed creditors. Reorganization proceedings seldom result in the full repayment
of the corporation's debt. Instead, they provide the mechanism to transfer most,
if not all, of the owners' equity to creditors, unless the owners are prepared to
inject new capital to prevent creditor losses.
4. Strong institutions and regulations to ensure the integrity of the insolvency
system. An effective insolvency system apportions the losses resulting from cor-
porate failure. It also provides oversight and dispute resolution functions within
the context of a reorganization proceeding. Thus, if its protection and counsel
are to be sought, its institutions and operations must be seen to be of the high-
est integrity. Judges must be well trained in the complexities of financial and
business arrangements, and in commercial and financial standards and prac-
tices. They must be free of conflicts of interest and bias, as well as seen to be
objective and impartial. Regulations governing the operations of the judicial
system should be based on firm rules and regulations that provide ready access
to court records, hearings, debtor and financial data, and other public informa-
tion. Even the slightest perception of corruption and undue influence must be
avoided.
D. INFORMAL WORKOUT PROCEDURES
In addition to a formal insolvency regime, effective asset resolution requires an
informal system that allows debtors and creditors to resolve their differences in a con-
sensual manner, without recourse to the judicial process. Formal bankruptcy proceedings
can be costly, time consuming, undermine public confidence in the firm, place a large
administrative burden on the debtor, and run the risk of loss of control. Many firms,
therefore, choose to renegotiate their debt directly with their creditors, without recourse
to the formal system. What is needed is a set of rules or practices to govern the conduct
of all parties during the negotiation process.
Many countries have adopted a variation of the so-called "London Approach . 4
In practice, the renegotiation process begins with the formation of a creditor's com-
mittee (or steering committee, if there are a large number of creditors) composed of
those institutions with the largest credit exposure to the borrower.' The committee
4. Each of the East Asian crisis countries adopted a version of the London Approach tailored
to meet its specific circumstances.
5. In cases where the bank group is unusually diverse, committee membership may be designed
to ensure that the divergent interests are represented. Multiple committees may be formed to
represent the interests of large numbers of similarly situated lenders (i.e., unsecured, secured,
bondholders, etc.).
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then, is responsible for conducting the negotiations with the borrower, developing an
acceptable restructuring plan, and communicating both with the debtor, and the other
creditors. It may retain professional advisors (legal, accounting, investment banking, and
the like) to assist in the development of a plan.
Amongst the first actions typically undertaken in the restructuring process, is the
negotiation of a clearly defined short-term standstill period, during which the creditors
agree to take no action to enforce their claims. This provides a measure of stability to
both the company and its creditors, and allows both sides to concentrate on developing
an acceptable restructuring plan, without fear of the destabilizing effects of enforcement
actions.
During this period, the company must have access to adequate cash flow and liquid-
ity. In many cases, a moratorium on payments (principal and/or interest) is provided to
ease the pressure on the debtor. New money may be made available to the company, to
ensure its continued operation. While a formal insolvency proceeding is likely to contain
provisions for the extension of these funds on a "super priority" basis, such protection
is seldom provided under the general corporate law. In practice, however, most cred-
itor groups will agree on an informal basis, to allow a priority lien on collateral, and
grant a priority repayment status to any creditors willing to extend interim working
capital. Careful monitoring of the debtor's cash position, together with the preparation
and approval of cash budgets, is generally required.
In return, the debtor agrees to provide access to timely and accurate information on
its finances, operations, and future business prospects. In general, the reporting require-
ments are similar to those imposed in a formal proceeding. Given that there may be a
level of distrust of the borrower, most committees will insist that its professionals verify
the information.
The debtor also agrees to develop a "good faith" restructuring plan. By their nature,
restructuring plans are "unacceptable" to creditors. Therefore, to be seen as a "good
faith" effort, the plan must be reasonable, and must accurately reflect the borrower's
financial situation. It must treat similarly situated creditors equally, and in accordance
with the seniority of their claims. Most importantly, it must provide an outcome for
creditors, that is at least as good as the treatment they could expect to receive in a formal
bankruptcy proceeding.
A complete agreement amongst the creditors is generally not possible. So informal
workout proceedings require that the creditors agree amongst themselves that they will
be bound by a majority decision. The percentage of approval required is likely to vary,
but in general, should reflect the voting requirements of the bankruptcy law.
In some cases, even though the creditors are in agreement with a restructuring
proposal, the company will be forced to file a bankruptcy proceeding. Examples could
include the necessity of voiding or canceling certain classes of contracts (usually leases),
or the need to take advantage of certain tax treatments available only in a formal pro-
ceeding. In these cases, the company and its creditors may agree to a "pre-packaged"
bankruptcy proceeding. In this case, the reorganization plan has been pre-approved by
the creditors, and it is usually submitted to the court shortly after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. In this way, the proceeding causes minimal disruption to the com-
pany's business activities, and is generally concluded within the period of the automatic
stay.
Although at the outset of an informal workout process, the creditors agree to consider
a restructuring proposal, there is no assurance that an acceptable proposal can be found.
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Either party may fail to act in good faith, or the depth of the company's problems
may make reorganization impractical. It is important, therefore, to have the discipline
provided by the threat of a formal bankruptcy process. When bankruptcy is seen as
effective, and the outcome can be predicted with a good degree of certainty, it serves
as a powerful incentive for the parties to continue to negotiate, and tends to result in
the conclusion of restructuring transactions that are viewed by all parties involved as
"fairer."
E. CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Financial systems that are totally dependent upon banks are inherently unstable.
Banks accept short-term deposits, but many borrowers need long-term funds. This means
that banks have trouble maintaining their liquidity positions, and if crisis hits are likely
to be forced to call in lines to meet depositors withdrawals. A robust capital market
provides access to badly needed equity, and longer-term financial instruments. It can also
serve as a buffer to help damper financial distress. Firms are able to draw on the equity
markets when their banks are distressed, which allows them to continue to operate,
and even expand, without dislocation. By providing access to equity, markets lower the
overall leverage within the corporate sector.
Markets serve another valuable function, that is to ensure greater levels of trans-
parency, thus providing a credible mechanism to value firms. Markets require routine
publishing of financial data, and securities firms are expected to provide a level of due
diligence regarding the firm's prospects and valuation. The presence of outside sharehold-
ers leads to improvements in governance within the corporate sector. Markets, however,
are also subject to fraud and manipulation, thus appropriate regulation and supervision
is required to protect the investors.
F. CREDIT BUREAUS
Credit reporting bureaus collect and disseminate information regarding both con-
sumer and corporate repayment histories. Given that past practices serve as a good
indicator of future behavior, this knowledge serves as the cornerstone of sound lending
practices. In more informal economies, repayment histories are well known within the
small community in which borrowers operate. As commerce expands, an individual or
entity's repayment history becomes more difficult to ascertain. A credit bureau serves to
preserve that history, and make it available to all who extend credit.
In many countries, repayment histories are kept within the central bank. However,
bank secrecy laws may prohibit public access to this information. Furthermore, in many
countries official institutions or agencies are held in low regard. Credit bureaus owned
and managed by the private sector may be a better alternative. To be effective, the credit
bureau must be seen to be independent, and with appropriate safeguards to ensure that
the information is not subject to abuse and misuse. It must be accurate, easy to use
and inexpensive to access. This is of particular importance for small entrepreneurs, as
it may provide the only information on which they can base credit decisions, regarding
suppliers and others to whom they extend credit.
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G. LINK WITH FISCAL/MACRO ECONOMIC STABILITY
The role of sound fiscal policies and macroeconomic stability in economic recovery
is well known. Borrowers, lenders, and investors all require stability to assess and price
risk correctly. In climates of falling exchange rates, rampant inflation (or deflation),
or rising interest rates, corporate restructuring and asset sales will be difficult, if not
impossible.
What is less focused on, however, is the link between unresolved assets and economic
stagnation. A large overhang of nonperforming assets ties up capital resources which
could be put to more productive use elsewhere. As more and more of the banking
system's resources are concentrated in NPL's, financial intermediation slows. Funds are
not available to finance new, viable projects. Growth slows. Economic recovery cannot
take place until the burden of the unresolved loans is removed from the system, and
banks begin to lend again.
V. Implementation of Asset Resolution Process
Once a crisis has started, the authorities must move quickly to begin the resolution
process. If the enabling infrastructure is already in place, they will be able to focus on
fine-tuning and designing a strategy to speedily resolve the NPLs, in a manner which
achieves a high recovery rate with minimum disruption to asset markets. To do this,
assets will need to be resolved in a variety of ways. Four factors in particular will deter-
mine the success of the program: (1) public perception of how the program is designed
and administered; (2) consistency in the rules and their application; (3) the ability to
transfer assets, free and clear of contingent liabilities; (4) and the ability of creditors
and investors to achieve meaningful control over restructured entities (Corrigan, 2001,
Disposition of NPLs).
Much attention will be focused on the design and administration of any resolution
program. In particular, the public will be watching to see what signals the govern-
ment will send. Is the government serious about resolving the problems? Will the equity
interests of owners be diluted, control transferred, and the remaining losses allocated
equitably among creditors? Or, will it be as usual, with powerful, vested interests contin-
uing to be protected? Is the operation of the program transparent, and does it provide
adequate safeguards against opportunities for corruption or other irregularities? Does it
establish new standards for, or otherwise ensure, sharing of timely, accurate information
on a borrower's financial and business operations, and prospects? Is the program based
on an adequate legal framework and rule of law? Will it be enforced? The answers to
these questions will, in large part, determine the level of cooperation from borrowers,
and the interest of investors, particularly foreign investors.
Investors require a level of certainty. A clear definition of the rules, and consistent
application provides a level of confidence on which to base pricing decisions. The closer
the rules are to international standards and practices, and the greater the confidence that
they will be administered fairly, the higher the sale price of assets.
Investors must be able to obtain assets free and clear of intervening liens, as well as
achieve meaningful control over restructured entities. The value of an asset lies in the
owner's ability to obtain value from it. Any impediments to its use, including lack of
transferability and inability to exercise normal rights of ownership, or otherwise enforce
change within the organization, will seriously impact its price.
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A. ASSET RESOLUTION ENTITIES
When a bank fails in the ordinary course of business, the assets are liquidated in
accordance with local law. In most cases, the supervisory agency, or deposit guaranty
agency, will be in charge. But in the case of systemic crisis, the magnitude of the problems
far surpass the capacity of these institutions, and a different solution is required.
Most crisis countries have chosen to establish one or more asset management com-
panies (AMC) to oversee the resolution process. An AMC is an entity established for
the purpose of owning and/or "managing" assets. It may be either publicly or privately
owned. Its mandate with respect to the types of assets under management (banks, loans,
real estate, operating companies, and equities), the scope of activities that can be under-
taken (sales, corporate restructuring, billing, payment receipt, property management,
and foreclosure), and its mandated time span will vary in accordance with the desires of
the owners.
When an AMC is publicly owned, it may be preferable to refer to it as an asset
"resolution" company. The use of the word "management" has tended to divert attention
from its true purpose, which is to marshal the remaining assets from one or more banks,
categorize the assets by type (performing, nonperforming, type of collateral, industry,
real estate, furniture and fixtures), and then package them for sale, either individually or
in pools. Assets should be brought to market on a timely basis, without undue disruption
to the underlying markets, and in a manner that ensures the receipt of maximum value.
This may require the restructuring of a small number of assets. Given the importance of
unlocking the remaining value of nonperforming assets to economic recovery, the goal
of the resolution entity should be clearly focused from the outset, on the disposition
or liquidation of assets within a medium term framework, rather than the indefinite
"management" of the stock of nonperforming assets for a prolonged period of time.
Most crisis countries have established one centralized, public asset management
company. Some (China being the most notable example), however, have chosen to estab-
lish several public asset management companies to better focus on types of assets, provide
for a better span of control in cases where the number of assets is large, or to establish
better incentives for managers, through the creation of a competitive environment. Still
others have chosen to let the originating banks continue to resolve the assets.
Major advantages of a centralized asset approach, revolve around the consolidation
of the nonperforming assets into one institution. In cases where bank supervision is weak
and ineffective, a single, new agency may ensure stronger oversight, governance, and
management of the resolution process. The ultimate cost of the crisis may be reduced,
as economies of scale are achieved through the consolidation of scarce resolution skills,
avoidance of duplicative systems in each bank, and better ability to structure pools of
assets for sale. The most important advantage of a centralized AMC, is that it reduces
the potential for arbitrage in the resolution process, by severing the relation between
the bank and the borrower, and by providing standardized treatment for all borrowers.
A borrower with multiple lending relationships will negotiate with only one institution,
thus speeding up the resolution process, and preventing the opportunity for institutions
bargaining against themselves. With all relationships consolidated, the creditor gains
greater leverage in the negotiation process.
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Those in favor of a bank-led resolution effort, cite the benefits of reduced opportu-
nities for political interference; 6 maintaining the lending relationship in place, so as to
provide the possible opportunity for new funding; and the reduced possibility of loss of
valuable information regarding the history of the loan, documentation, and possessory
collateral during the transfer process. While not underestimating the importance of
these factors, it must be recognized that in many cases the relationship between the
borrower and the bank is the root cause of the problem.
Box 2: Advantages of Centralized Public AMCs vs. Bank Led Resolution Efforts
Centralized Public AMC
* Oversight, governance, and management of one agency, easier than in case of multiple
bank-led efforts.
* Provides the opportunity for the implementation of standardized treatment of all debtbrs.
* Severs the relationship between the bank and its borrowers, and allows banks to focus on
returning to profitability, and the return of intermediation.
* Aggregates loans and collateral from many banks providing focal point for restructuring
efforts. Provides economies of scale, which may lead to reduced resolution costs, through the
consolidation of scarce resolution skills and elimination of duplicative systems.
* Large number of assets provides better opportunity to structure asset pools to create value.
Bank Led Resolution
May be more difficult to exert political pressure against a number of financial institutions.
Preserves information and knowledge about the borrowing relationship.
* Banks can provide additional financing, if required to consummate a restructuring.
* Allows for continued, active management of assets.
Provides valuable training and reinforcement of resolution practices within the banks.
There is no evidence that one solution is preferable to the other. It is clear, however,
that to be effective, both require a strong enabling framework which includes the ability
to enforce contracts, and induce losses on borrowers and owners, and clear, consistent
policies and practices, as well as a steadfast commitment to resolving the assets primarily
through timely sales. (Klingebiel, 2000 and Dado & Klingebiel, 2001).
Resolution agencies are complex institutions that require strong oversight, gover-
nance, transparency, consistent policies and practices,7 and adequate levels of financing.
6. This is not valid in the case of publicly owned banks.
7. When there are multiple agencies, great care must be exercised to ensure that the standards,
policies and practices are uniform.
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The government, parliament, private sector, international financial institutions, and
bi-lateral donors are all stakeholders in the process. This requires that the resolution
agency's mandate is narrowly defined, well-understood, and generally accepted. It is
critical that the stakeholders understand that the AMC is merely a tool employed by
the government to implement its resolution policies. It should not merely set policy but
implement it. Nor can it, in and of itself, assure the success of the resolution efforts.
The government, itself, must set the course. Once established, the government must not
interfere in the daily operations or decisions of the agency.
Given the large sums of public monies involved and the importance of the resolution
efforts to economic recovery, both public and bank resolution agencies must be held to
the highest standards of transparency. Best practices require:
• Uniform standards of accounting, and associated guidelines and requirements
for the preparation of financial statements, subject to certification and veri-
fication by outside, independent auditors, internationally accepted accounting
principles should be applied; the statements should be routinely published and
available to all stakeholders.
" Uniform standards for internal management information systems, including the
regular preparation of operating budgets, together with projections of expenses
and revenue generation. These statements should be made available to oversight
and supervisory bodies.
" Periodic standardized reports of current and projected recovery rates, together
with actual cash proceeds to be received, net of all expenses associated with the
recovery effort. This information should be prepared on a best, worst, and most
likely case basis.
" Standard policies and procedures for asset valuation, cost benefit analysis to
determine best disposition strategy, and evaluation of debt to equity swaps, bid
proposals and other similar transactions.
• Standard documents and contracts to be used when executing sale transactions.
• Standardized policies regarding the information to be contained in credit files
maintained, for all assets together with the requirements for prudent manage-
ment of the assets (Corrigan, 2001, Disposition of NPLs).
The importance of complete and accurate credit file information, together with
prudent management of the assets cannot be overestimated. This factor alone, is likely
to have a greater impact on the value of the assets to be sold than restructuring efforts.
Investors base their pricing on an estimation of the proceeds to be recovered. The more
information provided, the greater the return. In a perfect world, every borrower's file
would contain complete information, but when banks fail, substantial gaps are to be
expected. Management must carefully weigh both the cost and feasibility of obtaining
all required information in a timely fashion, against the anticipated increased returns.
For small loans, it is not likely to be worth the effort, but for larger loans where the
borrower is generally cooperative, every effort should be made to update the file.
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Box 3: Suggested Credit File Information
Loan application and approval document.
Loan and Security Agreements.
Legal Opinion as to the validity of the transaction, and the enforceability of the collateral.
Original and current financial information on the borrower.
Original and current credit analysis.
Feasibility study and environmental report.
Current fair value appraisal report.
Current status report together with client visit memos.
Historical, as well as projected cash flow information.
Source: Arthur Andersen (1999).
B. ASSET SALES VS. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING
Assets left in the hands of the state deteriorate. Thus, the goal of a successful reso-
lution program, is to return the nonperforming assets to the private sector as quickly as
possible. To do this, assets must be sold. Much of the controversy regarding resolution
programs, revolves around the timing and manner of these sales. In cases where the
assets have not been marked to market, and the illusion of value persists, the disposi-
tion process may be viewed as a dumping, or fire sale of assets, particularly if the sales
are to foreign investors. All sales should be conducted through an open and transpar-
ent process, with all qualified investors provided access to the same timely and accurate
information. The due diligence period should be adequate in length for the complexity
of the transaction.
One of the most difficult decisions in asset resolution, is determining the proper
timing of sales. Should a given asset or pool of assets be sold today, or can a higher
return be achieved by waiting for further stabilization in the market? Early asset sales are
necessary to determine the clearing price of the assets. Due to the uncertainties regarding
the process, the nature of the assets, and the investor's ability to achieve an acceptable
rate of return, this price will, of necessity, be low. Once investors are seen to be making
money, competition will enter the market, and prices will rise.
To a certain extent, the timing, composition, and structure of asset sales will be
driven by the market's appetite. Asset resolution companies need to think of themselves
as marketing firms, and to be client (market) driven. They need to regularly survey
market participants to determine what they are interested in, and then attempt to meet
these needs by properly packaging their assets.
The temptation is great to hold assets, in an attempt to create value, particularly
through corporate restructuring. Corporate restructuring is absolutely necessary, but the
question remains "Is it better done by the public, or private sector?" There is little evi-
dence to support a public resolution company's claim to enhanced value through restruc-
turing. In order to be successful, the decision should be evaluated from an investor's
perspective. That is, will the anticipated sales price cover the purchase price of the asset,
plus all expenses incurred in holding and restructuring the asset, as well as provide for
an appropriate return for the risks associated with holding the asset?
When most people look at the disposition program, they just see that the resolution
agency received "X" amount at time period "t,' but "X+" at time period "t + 1." They do
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not factor in the time value of money, nor the cost associated with holding the asset. If a
proper calculation is done, few assets will be held for restructuring. Instead, they should
be sold to, and restructured by, the private sector, where the incentives for resolution,
including restructuring, are better.
In those cases where enterprise restructuring is deemed appropriate, great care must
be taken to ensure that the restructuring is done on commercial terms, and results in
an economically viable corporate entity. The restructuring process is apt to be lengthy
and contentious, as losses will have to be apportioned amongst the owners and cred-
itors. A change in ownership and management is likely to result, and one or more
noncore operations or assets of the company, must be sold to meet its restructured
obligations. The temptation, therefore, is to engage in "cosmetic" restructuring. This
generally involves some combination of grace periods on interest and principal pay-
ments, lowering the interest rate and/or the required principal payments, lengthening of
the ultimate maturity of the loan, and providing for excessive balloon payments. Each of
these features negatively impacts the cash flow of the repayment stream, and will directly
lower the ultimate price paid for the loan when it is sold.
When restructuring is conducted, a public asset management company should
develop and publish a set of core principals, guiding the restructuring process. These
should incorporate the principles for informal workouts discussed earlier, and provide
for the public asset resolution company to accept the decisions of a majority of similarly
situated private sector creditors.
C. SPECIAL INCENTIVES AND POWERS
In the case of systemic crisis, additional incentives to stimulate corporate restruc-
turing may be required. Common examples include:
* Permitting immediate debt write-off for tax purposes.
* Providing tax relief on the transfer of collateral in whole, or partial settlement
of debt (payment in kind).
* Rationalize the tax system with regard to debt-to-equity conversions.
* Harmonize taxes across financial instruments utilized in debt restructuring.
* Provide expedited approval process for approvals necessary to implement cor-
porate restructuring.
* Regulatory forbearance with regard to the treatment of restructured loans.
In cases where the legal and insolvency regimes are weak, public asset resolution
companies have been granted special or extra-judicial super powers. Generally, these
involve an expedited process for reducing claims to judgments and confiscating assets.
As they represent an infringement on a debtor's rights, they should be granted only
after sufficient public debate. Additional safeguards should be provided to guard against
potential abuse, including provisions for a limited lifespan for use of the powers, and
additional measures to promote transparency, are warranted.
D. EQUITY HOLDINGS
When corporations cannot repay their obligations, the losses must be allocated to
the shareholders first. Then and only then, should creditors forgive a portion of their
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debt in return for a share in the equity of the restructured entity. This technique, known
as a debt to equity swap, has been widely used in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.
Valuation of the resulting equity is difficult, and is seldom equivalent to the amount of
debt forgiven. But more importantly, there is an inherent conflict between lenders and
equity holders.
Public asset management companies are not equipped to exercise effective owner-
ship and governance. In addition, the obligations of owners to ensure that the company
is operated in a manner to ensure it can meet its debts, may in fact represent a contin-
gent liability to the state. To the extent additional funds are needed, the state may be
required to invest additional sums. They may also incur obligations to other creditors,
who can prove their interest was harmed by the actions, or inactions, of the government
as shareholder. When debt to equity conversion is required in the restructuring process,
the interests of the lender (the loan), and the owner (the equity), should be separated,
and appropriate management and disposition vehicles developed for the equity stakes,
separate and apart from the loan assets.
VI. Principles for Effective Asset Resolution
(Including Corporate Restructuring)
Asset resolution, is the process by which nonperforming assets removed from the
financial sector are reduced to cash. This is necessary for two reasons: (1) it allows the
state to recover a portion of the funds advanced to honor its deposit guarantee; and
(2) nonperforming assets lock up scarce financial resources, which must be reallocated to
viable enterprises to start and sustain economic recovery. As the resolution process makes
explicit the losses inherent in these assets, and results in a transfer of ownership and
control, it presents difficult challenges to the authorities. While successful asset resolution
policies contain core elements or principles, each country's response will differ depending
on its particular circumstances, macro-environment, legal and regulatory framework,
and the political tradeoffs involved. The core elements or principles enumerated below,
however, provide a framework for a successful resolution policy. The success of any given
country's efforts to resolve nonperforming assets, will in large part, rest on how these
elements are incorporated into the design of their resolution policies.
A. CREATING AN ENABLING FRAMEWORK FOR ASSET RESOLUTION
1. Principle 1-The Role of Government
Government should restrict its role in the asset resolution process, to providing the
coordination and leadership necessary to create a sound enabling framework that:
* Supports the intermediation of scarce resources to economically viable projects
to stop the flow of new nonperforming loans.
* Provides a liquidation and rehabilitation mechanism for distressed banks and
their borrowers.
* Provides regulatory and tax treatment that facilitates restructuring.
* Minimizes losses to the taxpayers, through prompt loss recognition and the
creation of an efficient, inexpensive, transparent, predictable and accountable
resolution process.
* Facilitates the ownership of assets by foreign investors.
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2. Principle 2-Speed Is of the Essence
Financial sector problems do not disappear with the passage of time. Prompt cor-
rective action is required to minimize the losses to taxpayers, and the dislocation of the
corporate sector.
3. Principle 3-Comprehensive, Consistent Approach
Borrowers, lenders, and investors require a degree of certainty to ascertain asset
values, and enter into restructuring transactions. A package of reforms and incentives,
consistently applied, yields greater results than a "hit or miss" approach.
4. Principle 4-Recognize the Losses
Assets removed from distressed banks are among the most impaired in the system,
and should be marked to market quickly, to enable the sales process to proceed in an
orderly manner. The establishment of realistic expectations, with regard to the value of
the assets, will minimize the criticism of "fire sales:' as well as provide a benchmark by
which to judge the effectiveness of the resolution process.
B. ELEMENTS OF AN ENABLING FRAMEWORK FOR ASSET RESOLUTION
1. Principle 5-Credit Culture
A sound, vibrant financial system is rooted in a strong credit culture or body of
practices, which ensure sound lending by banks, and repayment by borrowers.
2. Principle 6-Supervision and Regulation
Supervisors and regulators play an important role in creating a climate for asset
resolution, through requiring strong credit policies and practices within the banking
system, including the establishment of workout departments, and developing regulatory
treatment to encourage corporate restructuring.
3. Principle 7-Legal Framework for Creditor Rights and Insolvency
Asset resolution is dependent upon an efficient, transparent, reliable, and predictable
system to enforce credit claims. Key features of this system include:
* Enforcement of unsecured rights.
* The creation, recognition, and enforcement of security interests.
* An insolvency regime which provides for the timely, efficient, and impartial
resolution of debts, through either the liquidation of nonviable businesses, or
the rehabilitation of viable entities.
* Strong institutions and regulations to ensure the integrity of the insolvency
system.
4. Principle 8-Informal Corporate Workouts and Restructuring
Most loans are best restructured by debtors and creditors cooperating within an
informal, out-of-court process. This requires laws and procedures that:
* Require access to timely and accurate financial information on the borrower.
Encourage the extension of new credit with appropriate safeguards.
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• Preserve the relative position of all creditors within a given class.
• Support a broad range of restructuring activities, such as debt forgiveness,
reschedulings, restructurings, and debt/equity conversions.
* Provide favorable or neutral tax treatment for corporate restructuring.
5. Principle 9-Capital Markets
A robust capital market serves as an exit vehicle for lenders, by providing viable cor-
porate borrowers access to badly needed equity, and longer-term financial instruments.
Markets for the sale and trading of distressed debts, should be encouraged subject to
appropriate regulation of trading during the restructuring process.
6. Principle 10-Credit Bureaus
A borrower's repayment history serves as a valuable indicator of future performance.
Likewise, the desire to avoid a poor record can be a powerful incentive to induce repay-
ment/restructuring of past due loans.
7. Principle 11-Fiscal/Macro Economic Stability
A healthy corporate and financial sector is dependent upon fiscal and macroeco-
nomic stability. In cases of systemic crisis, investors' willingness to purchase assets, and
the price they are willing to pay, is dependent upon their perceptions of the government's
ability to restore stability and economic growth.
C. IMPLEMENTING THE ASSET RESOLUTION PROCESS
1. Principle 12-Involve the Private Sector
Assets left in the hands of the state deteriorate. Banks, particularly weak banks, may
not do a better job. Assets should be quickly returned to the private sector, where the
incentives for resolution, including restructuring, are better aligned.
2. Principle 13-Asset Resolution Vehicles
Asset resolution vehicles are merely tools to facilitate the resolution process. The
strength of the enabling framework, rather than the choice of a specific resolution vehicle,
will determine the success of the resolution process. Institutions participating in the
resolution process, should be subject to high standards of governance, be independent
from government influence and interference, and be accountable for their actions, to
ensure that the assets are not subject to fraud, mismanagement, misappropriation, waste,
or abuse.
3. Principle 14-Asset Sales
Asset resolution requires that all assets are ultimately reduced to cash through sale.
Assets should be sold as soon as their value (after recognition of all carrying costs) can no
longer be increased. This is often a subjective decision. All resolution transactions should
be conducted through an open and transparent process, with all qualified purchasers
provided access to the same timely and accurate information. Due diligence periods
should be adequate in length for the complexity of the transaction.
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4. Principle 15-Corporate Restructuring
Corporate restructuring is facilitated by the existence of both formal and informal
restructuring procedures. Key elements of the restructuring process include:
* A standstill period in which the major creditors agree to take no action while
they investigate the possibility of a reorganization.
* Provision of timely and accurate financial information to all lenders, to enable
them to assess the future viability of the borrower.
* Availability of adequate funds during the standstill period to ensure trade credit.
* Granting a priority status to any new funds advanced during the standstill
period.
* All creditors to maintain their existing positions during the standstill.
* Agreement by a majority of creditors (generally in the proportions required to
confirm a formal bankruptcy plan) to any restructuring.
* Creditors to bear loss, only after full dilution of existing shareholders. Creditor
losses should also be minimized by expense reductions, efficiency improve-
ments, and sale of all loss making or nonproductive assets owned by borrower.
5. Principle 16-Special Incentives and Powers
In the case of systemic crisis, consideration should be given to the design of special,
time bound incentives (particularly with regard to tax treatment), to stimulate corporate
restructuring. In cases where the legal and insolvency regimes are weak, public asset
resolution companies may be granted special, or extra-judicial super powers. As they
represent an infringement on a debtor's rights, they should be granted only after suffi-
cient public debate. Additional safeguards should be provided to guard against potential
abuse, including provisions for a limited lifespan, for use of the powers, and additional
measures to promote transparency.
6. Principle 17-Equity Holdings
There is an inherent conflict between lenders and equity holders. When debt to
equity conversions are required in the restructuring process, the interests of the borrower
and owner should be separated. Appropriate management and disposal vehicles should
be developed for the equity stakes separate, and apart from, the loan assets.
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